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Motivation. Due to technological advances such as the Internet and mobile comput-
ing, Security has become a serious challenge involving several disciplines of Computer
Science. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the analysis of security
protocols and one promising approach is the development of formalisms that model
communicating processes, in particular Process Calculi. The results are so far encour-
aging although most remains to be done.
Concurrent Constraint Programming (CCP) is a well-established formalism which
generalizes Logic Programming [Sar93]. In CCP processes interact with each other by
telling and asking information represented as constraints in a medium, a so-called store.
One of the most appealing and distinct features of CCP is that it combines the traditional
operational view of processes calculi with a declarative one of processes based upon
logic. This combination allows CCP to benefit from the large body of techniques of
both process calculi and logic. Over the last decade, several reasoning techniques and
implementations for CCP have been developed: E.g., denotational models [SRP91],
specification logics and proof systems [NPV02], Petri Net interpretations [RM94], and
CCP-based programming languages [Smo95].
Remarkably, most process calculi for security have strong similarities with CCP. For
instance, SPL [CW01], the Spi calculus variants in [ALV03,FA01], and the calculus in
[BB02] are all operationally defined in terms of configurations containing information
which can only increase during evolution. Such a monotonic evolution of information
is akin to the notion of monotonic store, which is central to CCP and a source of its
simplicity. Also, the calculi in [ALV03,BB02,FA01] are parametric in the underlying
logic much like CCP is parametric an underlying constraint system. Also, the assertion
of (protocol) properties [ALV03] can be formalized as CCP processes imposing con-
straints. Furthermore, the notion of unification, which has been shown useful in [FA01]
for the symbolic execution of protocols, is primitive (and more general) in CCP.
Description. Our project Secure CCP (SCCP) aims at advancing both the theory and
tools of CCP for analyzing and programming security protocols. The main goal is to de-
velop a CCP-based framework for security protocols. The novelty is the combination in
one unique formalism of behavioral and logical techniques. In fact, to our best knowl-
edge, there is no work on Security that takes advantage of the reasoning techniques of
CCP such as its denotational models, temporal and intuitionistic logics, or Petri Net
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interpretations. The expected outcome is two-fold. We will advance the CCP theory to
deal with new challenging concepts from Security and produce a specification language
and tools to model and automatically verify security protocols.
Approach. The approach of the project will be to give a CCP account of a representa-
tive calculus for security protocols. We will use CCP constraint systems to represent a
logic to reason about the information an attacker can deduce from the information ac-
cumulated in the monotonic store. The CCP linear-time temporal logic and associated
complete inference system in [NPV02] and the verification results in [Val05] can be
used to specify and prove safety properties of protocol runs.
Now, most security protocols use mechanisms to allow generation of nonces (or
names). Therefore, we shall need to provide CCP with such mechanisms which have
been far too little considered in CCP. One approach to this problem will be to use con-
straint systems based on Nominal Logic [Pit01], a modern logic to reason about name
freshness. Another possibility is to extend CCP with an operation that provides name
generation. To keep the dual operational and declarative view of CCP, the extended lan-
guage should also have a logic interpretation. In fact, we have recently studied the issue
of name generation in [PSVV06] where we proved that existential quantification can
replace name generation in a meaningful process calculus.
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